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Summary: A basic issue that conﬂ  ict analysis investigates is 
how non-peaceful ways of living and governing become viable 
political strategies. Macro-level studies provide some important 
insights but micro-level analysis is vital to understand the mech-
anisms that make violence possible. This brieﬁ  ng outlines some 
preliminary ﬁ  ndings in this respect from MICROCON, a major 
research programme analysing violent conﬂ  ict at the micro level. 
It also discusses their implications for policies aimed at prevent-
ing the (re-)eruption of violent conﬂ  icts. An important overall in-
sight is the variety and combination of motives involved in each 
case. Given this complexity, policy strategies need to be based on 
a micro-level appreciation of peopleʼs strategies for coping with 
vulnerabilities to both poverty and violence.
•How do violent conﬂ  icts and 
non-peaceful ways of living 
and governing become viable 
strategies?
•What are the vectors and 
dynamics of mobilisation?
•How can policy tackle some 
of the major long-term caus-
es, and triggers of, violence?
1. Introduction
One of the most basic questions that 
conﬂ  ict analysis asks is how violent 
conﬂ  icts and non-peaceful ways of 
living  and  governing  become  vi-
able  strategies.  Violent  conﬂ  icts 
kill  and  injure  thousands  of  peo-
ple every year, and have a number 
of long-lasting effects that impede 
economic,  political  and  social  de-
velopment.
Since  the  mid-1990s  macro-level 
conﬂ  ict studies have been providing 
important  insights  into  the  causes 
of  violent  conﬂ  ict.  However,  the 
underlying  top-down  approach  of 
macro-level analysis is not equipped 
to deal with fundamental individual 
and  group  dimensions  of  violent 
conﬂ  icts. In the past few years the 
study of violent conﬂ  icts at the mi-
cro-level has been gaining ground, 
and  the  ﬁ  ne-grained  analysis  of 
such studies is vital to understand 
the mechanisms and channels that 
make  violence  a  possible  strategy 
amongst other forms of group be-
haviour.
This brieﬁ  ng outlines some of the 
preliminary  ﬁ  ndings  from  a  MI-
CROCON,  a  major  research  pro-
gramme  analysing  violent  conﬂ  ict 
at the micro level. It also discusses 
their implications for policies aimed 
at preventing the (re-)eruption of vi-
olent conﬂ  icts. 
2. The importance of micro-level 
analysis
Macro-level conﬂ  ict analyses have 
provided some important ﬁ  ndings, 
but have signiﬁ  cant limitations that 
prevent  in-depth  understanding  of 
the causes of conﬂ  icts. For exam-
ple, low GDP per capita has been 
found to be a robust determinant of 
civil war. However this does not tell 
us anything about the individual be-
haviour underlying this trend, and 
it could have at least ﬁ  ve different 
explanations: 
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1.  People are unemployed, and 
so join a rebel group as an alterna-
tive source of income 
2.  Employment  may  be  pos-
sible, but joining rebel groups may 
lead to increased earnings
3.  Grievances against govern-
ment and societal norms (inequali-
ties, ethnic/religious exclusion)
4.  The low capacity of govern-
ments in poor countries to protect 
civilians against violence
5.  The  low  capacity  of  gov-
ernments to win battles and defeat 
rebel groups
Finding  the  ʻrightʼ  explanation  in 
each case (and there can be more 
than one at work at the same time), 
makes  a  difference  for  the  choice 
of  policy  to  stop  violent  conﬂ  ict: 
should it be counter-insurgency, em-
ployment generation, safety nets or 
local crime reduction? Micro-level 
analysis is vital for providing the in-
formation to make these choices.
3.  Micro-level  ﬁ  ndings  on  the 
eruption of violence
MICROCON is a ﬁ  ve year research 
programme comprising 30 different 
projects that have been investigat-
 malnutrition and more starvation. 
Our research ﬁ  nds that rain shocks 
do  not  just  increase  malnutrition, 
they also increase the risk of con-
ﬂ  ict (though they do not necessarily 
cause it). For example, local leaders 
might be angry that the government 
did not provide food aid and they 
see their families starve, leading to 
a violent reaction; another mecha-
nism  is  that  when  income  goes 
down,  young  men  may  look  for 
another  source  of  income  outside 
agriculture and may join a nascent 
rebellion: in other words there is a 
lower ʻopportunity costʼ of conﬂ  ict. 
A second event is price shocks. At 
the moment of harvest people want 
to sell their produce, and the income 
from  these  sales  provide  for  their 
familiesʼ welfare. If at the moment 
of harvest there is a negative price 
shock and the price of the crop that 
people  have  been  working  on  for 
a whole year is a lot less than they 
thought, this can also increase con-
ﬂ  ict risk.
Horizontal inequalities
MICROCON research carried out at 
the University of Oxford has found 
that  inequalities  between  cultur-
Our research ﬁ  nds that rain shocks do not just increase malnu-
trition, they also increase the risk of conﬂ  ict 
ing  micro-level  conﬂ  ict  processes 
for the past two and a half years. 
At this mid-way point a number of 
preliminary  ﬁ  ndings  are  emerging 
on how violence becomes a viable 
strategy to change power relations. 
Political economy factors
There are a number of factors that 
can affect poor peopleʼs ability to 
provide  for  themselves  and  their 
families,  which  can  increase  the 
risk of conﬂ  ict. Developing coun-
tries are highly dependent on rain-
fed agriculture, and when rains stop 
there are smaller harvests than pre-
vious years, and there will be more 
ally  formed  groups  –  ʻhorizontal 
inequalitiesʼ  (HIs)  –  are  a  signiﬁ  -
cant factor in promoting violence. 
These inequalities can be multi-di-
mensional and can encompass eco-
nomic, social and political aspects. 
Research  on  inequalities  experi-
enced  by  Muslims  worldwide  has 
shown  that  these  inequalities  can 
be important both on a national and 
global  basis.  There  are  deep  HIs 
between  Muslim  populations  and 
others – within European countries 
and  within  almost  any  develop-
ing country where there is a Mus-
lim population which is not in the 
majority, and also between Islamic 
and non-Islamic countries, and at a 
social, economic and political level 
(Stewart 2009). These inequalities 
can explain some mobilisation, and 
there  are  strong  links  and  shared 
perceptions between Muslims in dif-
ferent parts of the world, such that 
inequalities  experienced  by  Mus-
lims in one part of the world can be 
a source of potential mobilisation in 
another part of the world. 
The role of identity and discourse
The factors above are important un-
derlying  causes  of  mobilisations, 
which  often  need  some  kind  of 
rallying point or vector to become 
violent  mobilisation. This  rallying 
point is often provided by discours-
es  about  identity.  MICROCON 
research  on Al  Qaeda  violence  in 
Europe  has  found  that  a  key  fac-
tor in individualsʼ mobilisation was 
the  rhetoric  that  the  organisation 
provided (Roy 2008). This allowed 
ʻrebels without a causeʼ to connect 
with a cause: by detailed examina-
tion of the biographies of perpetra-
tors of Al Qaedaʼs violence we ﬁ  nd 
that  political  ideology  plays  little 
role in their radicalisation, and they 
seem, rather, to have been attracted 
by the organisationʼs narrative.
A different but related phenomenon 
has been observed in violent mobi-
lisation in Africa. Here, the use of 
ethnic rhetoric has been particularly 
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Our observations suggest development should be a priority in 
itself, rather than just a part of a counter-insurgency doctrine
powerful  when  used,  often  cyni-
cally, by politicians to channel peo-
pleʼs resentments into violence. The 
cases of Côte dʼIvoire and Rwanda 
are particularly clear examples.
The  dynamics  of  group  mobilisa-
tion
MICROCON  research  on  the  dy-
namics of mobilisation reveals a va-
riety of different motives. Research 
on an ethnic militia in Nigeria, the 
Oodua Peopleʼs Congress has found 
that the primary motive for joining 
the  organisation  was  a  feeling  of 
danger and the desire for protection 
against fuzzily deﬁ  ned risks, includ-
ing  criminality,  and  menace  from 
other ethnic groups. A similar set of 
motives has been found in research 
in  Côte  dʼIvoire,  where  heavy-
handed government repression has 
played an important role. This is a 
motivating factor not just because 
people are angry at the government, 
but also because they feel more se-
cure within an armed group than as   
isolated citizens.
Research  in  Niger,  amongst 
members  of  the  Mouvement  des 
Nigériens pour la Justice has found 
more  complex  motives.  Exclusion 
and marginalisation, especially eth-
nic  marginalisation,  seem  to  play 
an important role. Also, the lack of 
access to the riches associated with 
uranium mining and heavy-handed 
repression by the Nigerien military 
are signiﬁ  cant. A further factor that 
Multidimensional policies to tackle 
inequalities
Within  the  development  policy 
agenda policies should be included 
to reduce the multidimensional as-
pects of horizontal inequality, such 
as  educational,  employment  and 
cultural policies; and power-sharing 
arrangements – with the objective of 
building inclusive societies. To de-
sign these policies we need to know 
about these inequalities, which also 
means  developing  analytical  and 
statistical tools to measure them.
Security and Development
There is much evidence to suggest 
that  economic  and  social  factors 
are  major  causes  of  civil  unrest. 
However, governments often resort 
to the use of police and military to 
tackle such upheavals, rather than 
using policies that directly address 
the causes of discontent. Evidence 
from India suggests that while po-
licing reduces conﬂ  ict in the short 
term,  the  continued  use  of  police 
has  either  inconsequential  effects, 
or even leads to increases in rioting. 
On the other hand, transfers have a 
signiﬁ  cant effect on the prevention 
and reduction of civil unrest, partic-
ularly in the medium term (Justino 
2007). 
However, a note of caution should 
be given: in current policy debates 
about the development-security nex-
us there is often the impression that 
security has become the major goal, 
and development has become a way 
of ʻwinning hearts and mindsʼ. Our 
observations suggest that develop-
ment should be a priority in itself, 
rather than just a part of a counter-
insurgency  doctrine.  Although,  as 
our ﬁ  ndings suggest, security is an 
important priority for poor people, 
this does not just mean counter-in-
many  analyses  often  miss  is  that 
people enjoyed being members of 
the organisation, which gave them 
an  idealistic  feeling  of  solidarity, 
and access to a fulﬁ  lling masculin-
ity.
4. Policies to prevent the use of 
violence as a political strategy
An  important  overall  insight  of 
these  preliminary  ﬁ  ndings  is  that 
there is a variety and combination 
of motives in each conﬂ  ict – it is not 
possible to just talk about one that 
applies across conﬂ  icts. There are 
differences between leaders and fol-
lowers; and also between individual 
motives and group motives. There 
are differences across conﬂ  icts, and 
causal factors also change over the 
course of conﬂ  icts. Given the com-
plex range and combination of fac-
tors  involved,  policy  strategies  to 
prevent the (re-)emergence of vio-
lence need to be based on a micro-
level appreciation of poor peopleʼs 
strategies for coping with vulnera-
bilities to both poverty and violence 
(Justino 2008).
Insurance  Schemes  to  Protect 
Against Livelihood Shocks
In the case of rain shocks and price 
shocks, governments in poor coun-
tries  should  provide  some  insur-
ance in the form of compensation 
for those affected. There is the pos-
sible issue of creating dependency 
through such a scheme, but this can 
be  minimised  if  the  insurance  is 
given only when required. There are 
a number of ways of assessing need, 
for example through the Food and 
Agriculture  Organisationʼs  moni-
toring of harvests.
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surgency but also the protection of 
vulnerable populations. This is di-
rectly linked to the attitudes of se-
curity services.
5. Conclusion
A more general point that has been 
raised by these preliminary ﬁ  ndings 
is that policymakers often lack the 
necessary information to make im-
portant policy decisions to prevent 
violence breaking out. It is vital to 
have a micro-level picture of what 
is driving individual behaviour, but 
this is very difﬁ  cult to come by in 
conﬂ  ict-affected contexts. We need 
to develop better diagnostic tools to 
assess potentially violent situations, 
and to ﬁ  nd ways to be more crea-
tive in how we gather information. 
These are challenges that MICRO-
CON will be taking up in the second 
half of its operations.
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